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In this issue...
Canada’s cross-border tax laws raise barriers that needlessly discourage
investment in Canadian private equity firms. We examine the harm
these barriers cause, and propose ways of reducing them.
Financing Canadian
Innovation: 
Why Canada Should End
Roadblocks to
Foreign Private EquityThe Study in Brief
Why do promising Canadian ventures attract only one-third the capital of their US competitors in the
North American marketplace? Why are many companies sold early in their life cycles, before they achieve
market leadership, and at low prices? Why is the 10-year, net horizon return of Canadian venture capital
firms a mere 2.5 percent, as opposed to 20.7 percent for US venture capital firms?
This  Commentary argues that important causes are Canadian tax rules which needlessly, and
unprofitably for Canada, block the inflow of hundreds of millions of dollars of needed foreign (mostly US)
capital from institutional investors and private equity firms. Canada’s cross-border tax scheme is
particularly hard on gains realized by nonresidents on the sale of shares of private corporations, in sharp
contrast to the treatment accorded under the tax schemes of other countries such as the United Kingdom
and the United States. 
This paper discusses the Canadian tax barriers to the entry of this needed foreign capital, the harm
those barriers cause, and ways to change those laws to unblock that critical capital flow. Among the key
recommendations:
First, the federal government should end the tax-clearance process that foreign private equity
investors must follow when selling shares of a private Canadian company.
Second, to prevent double taxation, the Canada-US tax treaty ought to be amended to provide US
limited liability companies the same tax treatment that ordinary US corporations receive when selling
shares of a private Canadian company.
Third, the federal government should permit tax-free rollover of shares of a Canadian company into
shares of a foreign company.
Without change, capital-starved Canadian companies will fail to commercialize much of the
nation’s R&D investment, raising the risk of Canada squandering a significant share of its intellectual
capital, and needlessly imperiling its future economic growth.
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C
anada’s private equity sector — in which individuals and institutions
fund  private equity firms that invest, in turn, in Canadian operating
companies — is needlessly hampered by Canada’s cross-border tax
laws. Those laws discourage investment by US institutional investors in
Canadian private equity firms and by US private equity firms in Canadian
operating companies. In this respect, the Canadian tax scheme stands in sharp
contrast to that of other countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United
States, where no similar cross-border tax barriers exist to this kind of foreign
capital. 
In this Commentary, we identify and discuss existing Canadian tax barriers to
the entry of foreign (mostly US) private equity from both buy-out and venture
capital firms
1 and of foreign (again, mostly US) institutional capital, primarily in
the form of pensions and university endowments. We examine the harm these
barriers cause, and we propose ways of reducing them.
In addition to the economic benefits that typically travel with cross-border
capital, investment in Canadian operating companies by US private equity firms is
usually accompanied by human capital. This human capital involves deep
knowledge of the US market and extensive networks of executive, sales and
marketing personnel, and familiarity with potential customers, distribution
channels, suppliers, and strategic partners in that market. In addition, Canadian
private equity firms that invest alongside their US counterparts have the
opportunity to develop relationships that enhance their investing skills, leading to
further co-investment opportunities in both countries.
These are important issues, because there is a shortage of capital flowing to
Canada’s private equity firms. Given the size of Canada’s gross domestic product
(GDP) and population relative to those of the United States, Canadian venture
capital firms should be receiving about 10 percent of the total funds invested in
the two countries’ venture capital firms. Their share, however, is far short of that
amount and falling, as Table 1 shows. It is not surprising, then, that the share of
investments in Canada by venture capital firms also falls far short of the amount
one would expect (see Table 2).
In 2005, emerging Canadian venture-funded companies raised an average of
C$3.1 million, while their US counterparts raised an average of C$10.4 million
(Thomson Financial 2006). Yet these companies compete directly in the same
North American market and ostensibly have the same need to be well capitalized.
An especially serious shortage exists in Canada of so-called later-stage B, C, and D
Stephen A. Hurwitz is a member of the Tax Policy Committee of the Canadian Venture Capital &
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Bill Robson and Finn Poschmann of the C.D. Howe Institute, as well as its talented editors and
reviewers, for their encouragement, support, and excellent contributions.
1 Buy-out firms and venture capital firms are almost invariably formed as limited partnerships,
with 20 to 100 or more limited partner investors. Buy-out firms invest primarily in control
positions in established private companies with positive cash flow sufficient to support
acquisition debt. In contrast, venture capital firms invest primarily in minority positions in
private companies at the seed, early-stage, and later-stage levels, often without positive cash flow
and, in some cases, without revenues or even a product. A private equity firm may invest in
dozens of operating companies during its life, which is usually about 10 years.2 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
Table 1: Venture Capital Fundraising, 2003–06
2006
Amount Raised 2003 2004 2005 (Jan-Sept.) 
Canadian dollars, millions
United States 14,212 23,359 33,274 28,936
Canada 1,973 1,779 2,220 1,286
Total 16,185 25,138 35,494 30,222
Canadian share of
North American total 12% 7% 6% 4%
Canadian dollars
Per capita, United States 49 80 112 n/a
Per capita, Canada 62 56 69 n/a
Per $1,000 of US GDP 0.92 1.52 2.27 n/a
Per $1,000 of Canadian GDP 1.63 1.38 1.62 n/a
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006) and Thomson Financial.
Table 2: Venture-Capital-Related Investments, 2003–06 
Amount Invested from any 2006
Source in North America 2003 2004 2005 (Jan.-Sept.)
Canadian dollars, millions
United States 35,985 37,495 35,276 29,670
Canada 1,695 1,843 1,820 1,190
Total 37,680 39,338 37,096 30,860
Canadian share of
North American total 4% 5% 5% 4%
Canadian dollars
Per capita, United States 124 128 119 n/a
Per capita, Canada 54 58 56 n/a
Per $1,000 of US GDP 2.34 2.45 2.41 n/a
Per $1,000 of Canadian GDP 1.40 1.43 1.33 n/a
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006) and Thomson Financial.venture financing, relative to the abundance of such funds in the United States,
which is critical to funding the market expansion of emerging companies.
2
The investment performance of Canadian venture capital firms also
significantly lags that of US firms. Over the 10-year period prior to the end of June
2006, Canadian venture firms had net horizon returns of 2.5 percent, while their
US counterparts achieved 20.7 percent (Thomson Financial and CVCA 2006). We
hypothesize that the underfunding of Canadian venture capital firms,
demonstrated in Table 1, is a significant contributing cause to their
underperformance. The less funding Canadian venture capital firms receive, the
less they have to invest in emerging Canadian companies.
To continue this argument, the more poorly capitalized emerging Canadian
companies are, the less competitive they will be in the North American
marketplace against their better capitalized US counterparts. The more poorly
these emerging Canadian companies perform, the worse is the resulting
performance of the Canadian venture capital firms that fund them. The worse the
performance of these Canadian venture capital firms, the greater their difficulty in
securing funds from institutional and other investors. And so this debilitating
cycle goes, reinforcing and causing underachievement for Canadian entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists alike.
3 Thus, at each level of the Canadian venture capital
sector, a significant shortage of capital exists relative to that available in the US
counterpart, and the data reported in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that fundraising and
investments by Canadian venture capital firms in 2006 will be at their lowest
levels in four years. 
Because Canadian and US private companies compete directly with each other
in the same North American market, the lack of capital of Canadian venture-
backed companies — on average, less than one-third of that of their US
competitors — is a significant handicap. Further, the inability of Canadian
operating companies to obtain sufficient capital to expand successfully in the
North American market also contributes to their having to be sold early in their
life cycles and long before they attain market leadership, frequently to large US
companies and often at low prices.
4
The result is that Canada is not deriving the full benefit of the billions of
dollars of direct funding the federal government delivers for university and
hospital research and development (R&D) or the indirect funding it affords
Canadian businesses through Scientific Research and Experimental Development
(SR&ED) tax credits (see Canada 2006).
5 Rather, this extensive federal government
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2 Venture investments are almost universally made in stages referred to as “rounds,” denominated
by letters starting with A, and often consisting of larger rounds as the investee firm grows and
has greater financial needs relating to product production and broader market penetration. In the
first three quarters of 2006, for example, follow-on venture financing in the United States totalled
C$21.75 billion, but in Canada only C$0.98 billion, or about 4 percent of the Canadian-US total
(Thomson Financial 2006).
3 Dr. Robin Louis, Chairman of Canada’s Venture Capital & Private Equity Association, has
reported on this cycle in various public addresses; see, for example, Louis (2004).
4 For a private equity firm to achieve a respectable performance, its portfolio companies must be
financed at sufficient levels so that at least a small number of them achieve market leadership.
5 Suspicion that Canada is failing to reap the full benefits of R&D investment is an emerging theme
in works such as MacKenzie (2006).funding has become, in effect, a subsidy to US businesses that acquire Canadian
companies cheaply, then reap the financial rewards when these companies achieve
market leadership. Worse, Canadian companies that are sold early to US
companies are often moved in their entirety to the United States.
Vast pools of private equity and institutional capital exist in the United States
that are seeking the highest return on their investments, with no governmental
restrictions on how much of that capital is invested outside the United States. But
surveys of US venture capitalists investing in Ontario and Quebec indicate that,
although Canadian talent and technology are major attractants, Canada’s cross-
border tax laws are seen as impediments to the flow of this much-needed private
equity capital (see Thomson Financial 2005a,b).
Impediments to US Private Equity and
Institutional Investment in Canada
What are the Canadian tax impediments to US investment? How do they
discourage such investment? What are the solutions?
Venture investments most often are made in private corporations, as are many
buy-out investments. However, Canada’s cross-border tax scheme is particularly
hard on gains realized by nonresidents on the sale of shares of private
corporations when compared with such tax treatment in the tax schemes of other
countries. For example, if a Canadian private equity firm were to invest in a US
private company, gain on the sale of shares of the US company would not be
subject to any US tax — the Canadian private equity firm and its investors would
pay only the taxes imposed by Canada.
6 By contrast, a US private equity firm or
institutional investor that invested in a Canadian private corporation would be
potentially subject to both US tax (at up to 15 percent of the gain) and an
additional Canadian tax (at 25 percent of the gross proceeds) unless it were to
comply with the onerous Canadian tax procedures described below.
The 116 Clearance Certificate
Following the worldwide pattern, Canada has entered into income tax treaties
with a number of countries in order to provide relief from double taxation. The
Canada-US treaty is typical in generally exempting US residents who dispose of
shares in private Canadian corporations from paying any Canadian tax on the sale
of those shares — the treaty exemption similarly applies to Canadians investing in
the United States. The United States automatically recognizes the treaty exemption
applying to Canadian firms so investing in the United States. However, and in
sharp contrast, a US resident who is fully exempt from Canadian tax must still
comply with an onerous administrative procedure prescribed under section 116 of
Canada’s Income Tax Act.
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6 An exception would apply in the case of investments in US companies where more than half the
value of their assets consists of real property.When applied to US private equity firms, most of which are structured as
partnerships, the procedure is time consuming, expensive, complex, and
uncertain. Briefly, an application must be made on a prescribed form (Form T2062)
for a certificate commonly referred to as a “116 clearance certificate.” The
application may be made in advance of the sale of Canadian private stock —
although full information, such as the foreign exchange rate, is not normally
available in advance of closing and often the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) will
not begin its analysis until all information is complete — but in any event within
10 days after the date of the sale, otherwise penalties may apply. Moreover, many
US private equity firms have 20 to 100 or more limited partner investors, each of
whom must submit a separate application because Canada “looks through” (or
essentially disregards) a partnership for tax purposes. If an investor in a private
equity firm is itself a partnership, then each of its partners in turn is also required
to submit an application, and so on. In some cases, thus, literally hundreds of
signatures may be required on hundreds of application forms.
Accompanying the application form is a long list of required supporting
material, which can vary depending on whether the investor is an individual,
trust, corporation, or other entity. For example, partners in a US private equity
firm who are individuals or corporations may be required to submit copies of their
most recent income tax returns filed in their countries of residence together with a
letter from the tax authorities in those countries confirming their residency status.
Moreover, all applicants must obtain a Canadian tax identification number in
addition to the number issued by their country of residence. For the individual
applicant, that means submitting a second prescribed form (Form T1261), together
with original or certified identification documents (such as birth certificate and
passport). In short, applications for 116 clearance certificates will not be accepted
until the applicant has been assigned a Canadian tax identification number.
Having cleared all bureaucratic hurdles thus far, the 116 clearance certificate
application Form T2062 is then processed by one of 45 CRA tax services offices,
with differing and often inconsistent practices and procedures. The time it takes a
US private equity firm to obtain approval can be unpredictable and varies widely,
ranging from several weeks to, more often, four to eight months. The risk, when
the sale of stock in a private Canadian company by a US private equity firm is in
exchange for marketable securities of the purchaser, is that a market decline may
occur when there is a delay in obtaining a 116 clearance certificate. This risk is well
known to US private equity firms that might otherwise consider investing in
Canada.
The CRA rarely issues a section 116 clearance certificate to a US private equity
firm before the closing of sales of private company stock. Yet, on closing, the
purchaser that does not have a certificate is required to withhold 25 percent of the
gross sale proceeds (including any noncash consideration), an amount that might
well exceed 25 percent of the gain. The purchaser must then remit these funds to
the CRA within 30 days of the end of the month in which the closing occurred, or
such later date as the CRA expressly allows in writing. The purchaser who does
not make the required withholding and remittances can be held personally liable
for Canadian taxes.
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firm investors before the remitting deadline; instead, it often provides a “comfort
letter” that allows the purchaser to retain the funds for a longer period of time.
But only much later, when the CRA actually completes its review of the
application and issues the certificate is the purchaser able to transfer the funds
withheld to the nonresident private equity firm. If the purchaser does not receive a
comfort letter and actually remits funds to the CRA, the nonresident then must
undergo a further delay while it claims a refund. 
If the applicant successfully navigates the application process, the CRA will
issue a 116 clearance certificate, which the applicant must then furnish to the
purchaser of the shares in order to release the 25 percent share of the purchase
price that was withheld. But the process is not yet complete. Even with a tax
clearance certificate in hand, the applicant must still file a Canadian income tax
return for the year to report the sale of the stock, even though no tax is due or
payable. The problem for US private equity firms is that many operate under
agreements prohibiting general partners from entering into arrangements that
require limited partners to file tax returns in foreign jurisdictions or to disclose
certain private information such as tax returns, thus precluding them from
investing.
US private equity firms and institutional investors do have some ways around
the 116 clearance certificate process. They can form an intervening subsidiary
corporation in a country, such as Barbados or Luxembourg, that has a tax treaty
with Canada for the avoidance of double taxation. The subsidiary can then submit
a single application for a 116 clearance certificate. They can also enter into an
exchangeable share program, where the Canadian operating company is
reorganized as a Delaware parent with a Canadian subsidiary.
7 The US private
equity firm then invests in the Delaware parent.
These ways around the 116 clearance certificate process are complex, time
consuming and expensive, especially the exchangeable share program, and
represent serious impediments to investment. The exchangeable share program in
particular, if not planned with the greatest of care, can result in the loss of SR&ED
credits. It can also cause difficulties for continuing investment by government-
subsidized private equity firms, such as the Business Development Bank of
Canada, and by Canadian labour-sponsored funds. Canadian entrepreneurs also
risk losing their ability to use the $500,000 small business capital gains exemption.
A further and relatively new problem arises for a Canadian company that goes
public only on the London Alternative Investment Market — the “AIM” stock
exchange — rather than having a dual listing on both AIM and the Toronto Stock
Exchange. Under Canadian tax law, because AIM is not a “prescribed stock
6 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
7 In an exchangeable share program, a US private equity investor invests in a new US company
that acquires a few shares of a Canadian operating company. Simultaneously, the shares of the
Canadian company held by its founders and others are converted into exchangeable shares —
exchangeable for stock of the new US company, often with a mandatory exchange in case of a
liquidity event or after the passage of a fixed period, such as seven years. Such an arrangement
permits the US private equity investor to invest directly in a US company, while postponing the
time of recognition of income by the Canadian founders and other shareholders, which occurs
when they exchange shares of the Canadian company for shares of the new US company.exchange,” shareholders not resident in Canada must still obtain a 116 clearance
certificate before shares can be sold on the exchange.
To avoid the impediment to attracting US private equity that the 116 clearance
certificate process represents, some Canadian venture capital firms, in what could
be a growing trend, now require their portfolio companies to become Delaware
corporations at the outset. Yet, Canadian government-funded and tax-subsidized
private equity firms are often prohibited from investing in companies, however
promising, that are incorporated outside the country, which can preclude them
from significant investment opportunities.
Further, if a Canadian venture capital firm accepts a US investor in its fund,
the Canadian firm itself becomes subject to the 116 clearance certificate process
with respect to its investments in Canadian operating companies. To avoid this
result, Canadian venture firms often sponsor separate US funds for US investors,
which is time consuming and costly. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many US investors simply are unwilling to
go through the complex, time-consuming, and costly acrobatics necessary to invest
in Canada, and choose instead to invest elsewhere. 
As a matter of policy, Canada does not tax most nonresidents on capital gains
from the sale of stock of private Canadian companies. This policy — embodied in
tax treaties with countries from which most foreign private equity investors in
Canadian private companies come — effectively reduces the Canadian capital
gains tax to zero. To the extent that the current section 116 clearance process
prevents any tax “leakage,” it likely affects only a small group of investors. Since
Canada probably would agree to enter into a treaty reducing the capital gains tax
to zero for any country with which it had commercial relations of significance,
there is little to be gained by sticking to the 116 certificate process. In fact, a
process meant to assure treaty compliance might itself be sabotaging the policy of
furthering foreign investment in Canada that the treaty implements.
Our Solution
The most effective solution would be for Canada to give foreign investors the
same tax treatment as exists in the United States and United Kingdom: no tax
generally exists on gain when a Canadian investor sells shares in a private US or
UK company.
If that solution is not acceptable, certain limited exceptions could be created -
such as a legislated definition of a “private equity firm” — so that sale of stock in
a private Canadian operating company by a US private equity investor would not
be subject to withholding tax. Alternatively, the tax clearance certificate process
could be streamlined so that, to avoid Canadian tax withholding, the selling
foreign investor is required merely to file a claim for treaty benefits with the
purchaser, rather than obtain a 116 clearance certificate from the CRA. In either
case, the solution should be self executing, and should avoid any governmental
approval or certification process that replicates the kinds of administrative
burdens inherent in the current approval process. Compliance with these
proposed solutions could also be monitored if, shortly before or after the sale,
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 7either the seller or the purchaser were required to give the Canadian government
formal written notice confirming all the factual requirements for legal compliance. 
The issue of the Alternative Investment Market should be easy to resolve.
Already, Canadian tax law recognizes as “prescribed stock exchanges” several that
are smaller than AIM, and it should not be difficult to extend the same exempt
status to AIM.
8
The Problem of Limited Liability Companies
US limited liability companies (LLCs) face special cross-border issues. Because of
their corporate features, Canada considers LLCs to be corporations, not
partnerships. The CRA has indicated that it does not consider LLCs that have
elected to be treated as partnerships under US tax law to be either US “residents”
for purposes of the Canada-US income tax treaty or eligible for tax relief from
double taxation under the treaty. This CRA interpretation is based, in part, on a
Supreme Court of Canada decision that, for an entity to be entitled to treaty tax
relief, it must be “liable to tax” in the country of the treaty partner. Because LLCs
are considered separate legal entities by Canada, but are treated in the United
States as “flow-through” partnerships,
9 the CRA views them as not being “liable
to tax” in the United States and, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of the tax
treaty.
Because many US private equity firms have LLCs among their partners, this
Supreme Court interpretation has created a serious potential problem of double
taxation for those that seek to invest in Canada. Yet, Canada gains no discernable
benefit from this failure to extend treaty benefits to LLCs, and continuing
negotiations with the United States have so far failed to resolve the issue.
Our Solution
The LLC problem could be solved if the two countries were to amend the Canada-
US tax treaty or enter into a protocol clarifying that the treaty relief applies to
LLCs, or if the Canadian government were to create a legislated definition of the
term US “resident” expressly to grant treaty tax relief to LLCs. In the alternative,
the CRA could adopt an administrative position providing for LLCs to be covered
by the treaty, or a narrower definition could be created under the treaty to provide
tax relief solely to LLCs that are private equity firms. In either case, as with
reforms to the 116 clearance certificate process, the solution should be self-
executing and aim to reduce bureaucratic barriers as much as possible. Again,
formal written notice by the parties to the Canadian government would enable the
monitoring of legal compliance.
8 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
8 In value and volume of securities traded, AIM is much larger than, for example, the New
Zealand Stock Exchange. For the current list of prescribed exchanges, see website:
http://lois.justice.gc.ca/en/I-3.3/C.R.C.-c.945/136862.html#section-3201.
9 In the United States, the income of LLCs flows directly to their members, who bear any resulting
tax liability.Limitations on Tax-Free Rollovers
Canadian investors in a Canadian company are permitted a tax-free rollover when
the company’s shares are exchanged for shares of another Canadian company, but
not when they are exchanged for shares of a non-Canadian company. This is a
serious impediment to cross border investment because it can create a conflict of
interest between the founders and foreign private equity investors in what is
called a “liquidity event.”
One kind of liquidity event is an initial public offering. In this case, the most
favorable terms might be available if the Canadian company’s shares were sold on
a foreign market, with the company first being redomiciled to the country in
which the market is located. Another kind of liquidity event would occur if the
company were acquired in exchange for equity of the acquirer. In both cases, US
private equity investors in a Canadian company would enjoy tax-free rollover
treatment under US law, but no such treatment would be available to the
Canadian founders and investors in the company. The resulting conflict between
the interests of the Canadian shareholders and those of the foreign private equity
investors could result in the company’s being sold in a market or in a manner that
brings a lower price than might otherwise have been obtained.
Our Solution
Proposals to extend tax-free rollovers to all Canadian investors have appeared in
federal budgets for four years, but none has been acted upon. We believe it is time
that Canada enact such a law. A more limited but still effective approach would be
to limit the tax-free rollover benefit solely to Canadian companies that have
foreign private equity investment. With appropriate safeguards, the CRA could
collect tax at the time the Canadian resident ultimately disposed of the rollover
stock of the foreign acquirer.
Loss of CCPC Status
Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPCs) are private corporations
incorporated in Canada that are not controlled, directly or indirectly, by
nonresidents or by public corporations (or any combination of the two). The
importance of this status is that CCPCs are entitled under Canadian law to certain
tax benefits, including higher refundable tax credits, certain federal tax reductions,
favorable treatment on employee stock options, and a $500,000 capital gain
exemption available to individual shareholders who are resident in Canada. The
corporation’s CCPC status might be jeopardized, however, if a foreign private
equity firm’s investment in it is significant enough to cause the loss of Canadian
control of the company. Presented with potential US investment, therefore, the
company’s founders often must either accept the investment and lose the benefits
of CCPC status, or decline it and preserve their status.
Our Solution
The tax benefits to which CCPCs are currently entitled should be based on their
maintaining certain levels of business activity and/or employees in Canada, rather
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 9than on Canadian control, ownership, or incorporation. This change would ensure
that tax benefits are afforded to companies only when there is a significant
continuing economic benefit to Canada. A more focused solution would be to
permit a limited exception to the requirements of Canadian control, ownership,
and incorporation, but only while a Canadian company (i) is at an early stage of
development, (ii) has a domestic or foreign private equity investor that has
invested at a certain level, and (iii) maintains a certain level of employees and/or
business in Canada.
Conclusion
Canadian tax impediments to cross-border flows of private equity hinder
Canadian companies in their competition in the global marketplace for access to
much needed US investment capital and its associated human capital. These
impediments prevent significant amounts of capital from coming into Canada for
investment in the private equity sector, or at the very least increase the costs,
complexity, and time required to invest in Canada. Canada’s predicament will
only worsen as other countries — from emerging giant players such as China and
India to smaller, competitive jurisdictions such as Ireland and Israel — take
increasingly vigorous stands to attract foreign capital.
The federal government recently removed restrictions on investments by
Canadian pension plans in “foreign property” outside of Canada that exceeds 30
percent of all its property. To an outside observer, it seems odd that, despite such a
move, major tax impediments to the flow of a much larger pool of US institutional
and private equity capital into Canada remain unaddressed.
A more complete assessment of the proposals in this Commentary would
require a comparison of the amount of revenue the 116 clearance certificate process
raises from US private equity firms and institutional investors, the cost of its
enforcement, and the cost to Canada’s economy. Such an assessment, however, is
not possible in the current state of our knowledge. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that the overwhelming majority of applications for tax clearance certificates by US
private equity firms are eventually granted with no tax owing. It would be
informative to know how much of the tax revenues, if any, actually raised in that
process come from US private equity firm investors who are entitled to treaty
exemption from paying the tax but who are unable to comply with the
certification process.
10 More difficult to determine would be the number of those
investors who, based on either an unsatisfactory experience or their knowledge of
the unsatisfactory experience of others, decline to make investments. Yet this — or,
more precisely, the cost to Canada of the economic activity foregone — may be the
biggest problem cross-border barriers create.
It is hard to imagine any benefit to Canada in not amending the Canada-US
tax treaty to entitle LLCs to exemption from double taxation. Excluding US LLCs
from the treaty results in the generation of little or no Canadian taxes; likewise, it
results in little or no investment by US LLCs in Canada, because US investment
10 C.D. Howe Institute Commentary
10 We understand that CRA data may be able to establish how much tax revenue, if any, has been
collected in the past from US venture capitalists in the 116 certificate process.entities with LLCs in their structures, owing to their being subject to double
taxation, simply will not invest in this country. If and when Canada agrees under
the treaty to exempt LLCs from double taxation, there should be no further need
for the 116 clearance certificate process to apply to US private equity firms or
institutional investors, since it is highly improbable that they would then have any
investors in their structures that would not be treaty exempt.
Less detrimental are the roll-over and CCPC tax impediments. But they, too,
act to hinder US investment in Canada and should be removed.
Canada spends billions of dollars to fund R&D, whether directly to
universities and hospitals, or indirectly through SR&D tax credits. It is not
surprising, then, that respected international agencies often rank Canada at or
near the top in those things that matter most to an economy and a society —
science, engineering, research — and sometimes ahead of countries, such as the
United States, with far larger economies and populations. 
The Canadian private equity industry is a principal vehicle for successfully
commercializing Canadian technology in order to convert those billions of dollars
of Canadian R&D investments into real economic gain and societal benefit. If the
Canadian private equity industry and its technology and life sciences portfolio
companies continue to remain underfunded, much of this investment in R&D
could be lost.
A simple, uncontroversial logic underpins our recommendations. Economic
transactions between knowledgeable, well advised parties presumably are
beneficial to both sides. The onus is squarely on those who would impede them to
show why the impediment is justified.
References
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2006. U.S. Department of Commerce.
http://bea.gov/bea/dn/gdplev.xls.
Canada. 2006. Department of Finance. Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2005. Ottawa; available at
website: http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp/2005/taxexp05_3e.html#Table2.
Louis, Robin. 2004. “The Canadian Venture Capital Industry.” Speech by the President, Canada’s
Venture Capital & Private Equity Association, March 3.
McKenzie, Kenneth J. 2006. “Giving with One Hand, Taking Away with the Other: Canada’s Tax
System and Research and Development.” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 240. Toronto: C.D.
Howe Institute.
Thomson Financial. 2005a. “The Activity of American Venture Capital Funds in the Ontario Market:
Issues, Trends and Projects.” Toronto.
———. 2005b. “The Activity of American Venture Capital Funds in the Quebec Market: Issues,
Trends and Prospects.” Toronto. 
———. 2006. “Canada’s Venture Capital Industry in 2005.” Toronto.
Thomson Financial and CVCA (Canada’s Venture Capital & Private Equity Association). 2006.
“Canada’s Venture Capital Industry in Q3 2006.” November 13. Toronto.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 11NOTESRecent C.D. Howe Institute Publications
February 2007 Iacobucci, Edward M., Michael J. Trebilcock and Tracey D. Epps. Rerouting the Mail: Why
Canada Post is Due for Reform. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 243.
February 2007 Cherniavsky, Ben and Benjamin Dachis. Excess Baggage: Measuring Air Transportation’s Fiscal
Burden. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 242.
January 2007 Payne, A. Abigail and Huizi Zhao. “Uncharitable Treatment? Why Donations to Private and
Public Foundations Deserve Equal Tax Status.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
December 2006 Kitchen, Harry. A State of Disrepair: How to Fix the Financing of Municipal Infrastructure in
Canada. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 241.
December 2006 Chant, John. “The Passport Package: Rethinking the Citizenship Benefits of Non-Resident
Canadians.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 99.
November 2006 Gray, David M. “Has EI Reform Unraveled? Canada’s EI Regime in the 2000s.” C.D. Howe
Institute Backgrounder 98.
November 2006 Daniels, Mark R. “Insurers and Banks: Levelling the Regulatory Playing Field.” C.D. Howe
Institute Backgrounder 97.
October 2006 Robson, William B.P. “Time and Money: Tracking the Fiscal Impact of Demographic Change
in Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
October 2006 Laidler, David. “2 Percent Forever? Inflation Targets Need Fresh Scrutiny.” C.D. Howe
Institute e-brief.
October 2006 McKenzie, Kenneth J. Giving with One Hand, Taking Away with the Other: Canada’s Tax System
and Research and Development. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 240.
September 2006 Mintz, Jack M. The 2006 Tax Competitiveness Report: Proposals for Pro-Growth Tax Reform. C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary 239.
September 2006 Guillemette, Yvan and William Robson. “No Elixir of Youth: Immigration Cannot Keep
Canada Young.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 96.
September 2006 Laidler, David. Grasping the Nettles: Clearing the Path to Financial Services Reform in Canada. C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary 238.
September 2006 Poschmann, Finn. “Recalibrating the Federal Balance: Federal-Provincial Fiscal Priorities for
2006 and Beyond.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 95.
August 2006 Richards, John, and Mathew Brzozowski. Let’s Walk before We Run: Cautionary Advice on
Childcare. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 237.
Août 2006 Richards, John, and Mathew Brzozowski. Marchons avant de courir: Une mise en garde à propos
des services de garderie. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 237.
July 2006 Guillemette, Yvan. “Wasting Talent: The Risising Dispersion of Unemployment Rates in
Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
July 2006 Goldfarb, Danielle. Too Many Eggs in One Basket? Evaluating Canada’s Need to Diversify Trade.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 236.C
.
D
.
 
H
o
w
e
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
6
7
 
Y
o
n
g
e
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
 
S
u
i
t
e
 
3
0
0
T
o
r
o
n
t
o
,
 
O
n
t
a
r
i
o
M
5
E
 
1
J
8